Changing Threat Perceptions and the Efficient Provisioning of International Security by Gupta, Rupayan
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Changing Threat Perceptions and the
Efficient Provisioning of International
Security
Rupayan Gupta
Roger Williams University
7. January 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24016/
MPRA Paper No. 24016, posted 21. July 2010 12:45 UTC
Changing Threat Perceptions and the E¢ cient Provisioning of International
Security
Rupayan Guptay
January, 2010
Abstract
This paper extends Gupta (2010), which proposes a mechanism for the structuring of international
institutions for the e¢ cient provision of global security. In that paper, the level of threat by a rogue
nation was assumed as being exogenously determined. This paper uses a similar framework to the one
seen in Gupta (2010) to analyze the robustness of the results seen in that paper, in the case where the
threat is endogenized. Additionally, this paper investigates how the evolution of public opinion in the
respective countries facing the rogue nations threat, impacts the e¢ cient provisioning of global security.
1 Introduction
This paper extends Gupta (2010), which proposes a mechanism for the structuring of international institu-
tions for the multilateral provision of global security by an alliance of nations, acting in concert against the
threat of a rogue nation. In Gupta (2010), the level of threat by the rogue nation was assumed as being
exogenously determined. This paper uses a similar framework to analyze the robustness of the results seen
in that paper, in the case where the threat is endogenized in the model (due to the presence of a rogue nation
which acts strategically vis-à-vis the alliance, hence making the threat level variable in response to action
by the alliance).
As in Gupta (2010), security e¤ort by an alliance member is assumed to be non-rival and non-excludable,
so the benets of the e¤ort jointly accrue to every other member. This e¤ort has both positive and negative
e¤ects, as security measures prevent attacks by the rogue nation, but also involves loss of personal rights,
commercial benets, etc. I characterize the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game of joint e¤ort provision
among the nations in case of an exogenously specied level of threat. In this equilibrium a single nation
unilaterally provisions e¤ort for the whole alliance. For specied conditions, this level of e¤ort may be either
greater or lesser than the e¢ cient level.
Very Preliminary - please do not quote. I am grateful to Oscar Volij, Brent Kreider, Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, and session
participants at the Public Choice Society Conference (2009) and the AEA/ASSA Annual Conference (2010), for comments on
an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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In Gupta (2010), I suggested an institutional structure for the alliance which would lead to the achieve-
ment of the e¢ cient level of world security through multilateral contribution. This structure required that
voting on the issue of security provision for the alliance be restricted to a subset of member nations, as well
as the requirement of unanimity among these nations to adopt a resolution. Interestingly, the set of voters
included nations that have the lowest preference of security e¤ort provision and the one that has the strongest
preference, but excluded those having preferences close to the latter. The current paper demonstrates that
the results of Gupta (2010) are qualitatively robust in the case of endogenous threat levels, i.e. a comparable
institutional structure would lead to the achievement of e¢ ciency even in this case.
An additional contribution of the paper is to characterize the dependency of the multilateral response to
rogue nations on the evolution of national public opinion against threat of such nations, within the respective
member nations of the global alliance. Results show that the maintenance of the alliance is dependent on
whether the public in the ally nations harden or soften their proclivity for proactive action against the rogue
nation, upon the escalation of conict. Interestingly, it is seen that often the divergence of public opinion
among the respective nations (for example, public opinion in nation A hardening in favor of action against the
rogue nation, while that in nation B moving against action) actually helps in the multilateral provisioning
of global security in certain cases, while it hampers such e¤orts in other situations. Other combinations
of evolving public opinion in the respective member nations of the alliance, and the implications for the
maintenance of the alliance against the rogue nation, are also examined.
As with Gupta (2010) the contribution of this paper to the economic theory of alliances1 can best be seen
in the post Cold-War context in which the tastes of traditional allies regarding global security issues have
diverged to an extent not seen previously. In fact, this divergence is so marked that there seems to be
disagreement among these nations whether after a certain level security e¤ort is intrinsically goodor bad,
as seen by the French and German reactions to the Second Gulf War. In contrast, during most of the Cold
War, US defence provisions in Europe were mostly supported by all NATO members. This forces us to
rethink our earlier conclusions on how best to structure alliances like the NATO or the United Nations. In
this process we add to the literature on the economics of alliances that began with Olson and Zeckhausers
seminal contributions (1966 and 1967), and continued with later contributions by Murdoch and Sandler
(1982), McGuire (1990), Bruce (1990), and McGuire and Groth (1985). In the context of the current paper,
Weber and Wiesmeths (1991) analysis of a supranational institutional structure for NATO, that leads to
quasi-egalitarian cost-sharing among the members, is of special interest,2 as is Niou and Gans (2005) analysis
1For a comprehensive review of this literature see Hartley & Sandler (1995a & 1995b). In addition to the alliance literature,
there is some literature on terrorism that is interesting, including Lee (1988), Lee and Sandler (1989),Sandler and Lapan (1988),
and Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983).
2For cooperative solutions to such problems, see Moulin (1995). For discussions of institutional arrangements within a nation
for the allocation of defense budgets, see Murdoch, Sandler, and Hansen (1991) and Jones (1992).
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of Olsons (1965) propositions of suboptimality and exploitation (in the context of collective action in the
face of endogenized external threat). As with Gupta (2010), the current paper adds to the literature by
assuming that security e¤ort may not only have positive externalities, but also have negative externalities
beyond a point. The institutional structure suggested by the paper takes into consideration this important
assumption, which is driven by realities currently observed in the international arena. Section 2, below,
develops a model of global security provision. Section 3 discusses the implications of the ndings of the
model. I conclude in section 4.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
In this section we extend the model seen in Gupta (2010) to make the level of threat by the rogue nation
endogenous. In reality, rogue states react to the actions of their adversaries, so we need to take that into
account. This analysis will reveal if the ndings of the model with an exogenous level of threat undergo
any modications for the level of threat being endogenous. As in Gupta (2010), there is a nite number of
countries (governments) i = 1; 2; ::::::; I forming an alliance, to ght against a level of global threat t 2 [0;1).
The utility of government i is given by:
U i(mi; e; t) = mi + Si(e; t) N i(e)
= mi + i(t)S(e) $iN(e)
= mi + i(t)e $ie2
Here mi is a private good (money) consumed by i, e =
PI
i=1 e
i is the amount of joint e¤ort expended by the
alliance against the rogue nation, ei is is contribution to the joint e¤ort. E¤ort is assumed to be proactive,
non-rival, and non-excludable - its results jointly accrue to every member. Note that this e¤ort might include
military action, trade embargoes, and other kinds of punitive action. Let i(t) 2 (0;1) be di¤erent for each
nation (we explain below what  is), or i(:) 6= j(:);8i; j: Let $i = 1. For the present I assume that  is
increasing in the level of threat t, hence it > 0 (this assumption will be modied in later sections, to explore
certain other plausible situations that might occur). The value of (:) is greatest for country I for any t,
so I(:) > i(:);8i 6= I. The other (I   1) alliance members are ranked according to the value of their s,
such that for all t, I 1(:) > I 2(:) > :::: > 1(:): The marginal benet of e¤ort for i is [i(t)  2e], which
implies @
2U
@e@t > 0: The marginal benet is more for higher 
i(t): i may be thought of as an index of public
support for security e¤ort in a nation.3 Briey, the governmentsutility is dependent on the amount of
3Some readers might like a nations e¤ort to have some e¤ect on public support for the government, as the public might
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private good consumed and the security e¤ort expended by the alliance. However, such e¤ort does not only
have the positive e¤ect of increasing security S(e) = e by eliminating the threat,4 but also has a negative
e¤ect N(e) on utility in case the e¤ort put in by the alliance infringes on human rights, trade contacts,
etc. Both these elements are captured in the governments utility function by the term Si(e; t)   N i(e) =
[i(t)e  e2], where Si(e; t) = i(t)S(:) = i(t)e and N i(e) = $iN(e) = $ie2 = e2 (assuming $i is 1 for all
nations). For a given level of t, an increase in joint e¤ort e leads to greater utility by providing security, but
also has a disutility that is captured by the part e2: For a more detailed discussion and justication of the
governments utility function see Gupta (2010).
There is a rogue nation L which makes the decision to make e¤ort t 2 [0;1), which gives the level of threat
against the alliance of countries seen above.5 The utility of the rogue nation is given by:
UL(mL; t; e) = mL + L(e)t  t2
where mL 2 [0;1) is a private good (money) consumed by L, and 0 < L(e) < 1 is a preference index of
the rogue government, and is a measure of the support it has for it activities from within its constituency.
Let e < 0:
The rogue government have a positive benet from undertaking e¤ort, as well as disutility from that e¤ort.
The positive benet would come from causing harm to what they consider enemy nations. However, a
rogue state may su¤er various e¤ects of trade embargoes, and there might be restrictions on its citizens in
travelling to other parts of the world or having business contacts, and so on. All this increases if e¤ort
by the security alliance, e, goes up. This reected by the fact that e < 0; which leads to the disutility
of the rogues e¤ort being more for more e. The marginal utility of the rogues e¤ort (activity) decreases
with an increase in the given level of e, i.e. @
2V L
@t@e < 0: The budget constraint of the rogue country is
given by: ml + C(tL)  ML;where 1 > ML > 0 is the initial endowment of the private good of L and
C(tL) = vtL; v > 0; is the cost of threat activity level tL:
have to ultimately pay for e¤ort , perhaps by way of higher taxes. I make the simplifying assumption that even if such an e¤ect
is present, it is purely decomposable from the support for security e¤ort that arises from the publics perception of threat. If
that is the case, then if for the sake of simplicity if I assume that some part of public support for the government su¤ers from
an inrease in e¤ort in a linear fashion, then it can be made part of e¤ort costs, and will not a¤ect the results of this paper
qualitatively. In other words, if the e¤ort based support for the government su¤ers for increasing e¤ort, then a cost function
written as (e) = e can be subsumed into the overall cost structure of e¤ort provision in this model. Hence, in what follows I
choose to ignore this detail.
4 I assume there is a simple linear technology converting e¤ort to a level of security (by destroying the threat). The process
how e¤ort eliminates the threat is not modeled.
5For the detail oriented, I could have modeled a linear technology that would have mapped e¤ort by the rogue nation
one-to-one onto a level of threat. However, I choose to neglect this technical detail and interchangeably use the concepts of
e¤ort by the rogue nation and the level of threat presented by it. This shortcut does not a¤ect the results of my model.
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2.2 The basic game
I consider that all countries play a simultaneous move game with respect to its alliance members and with
the rogue enemy nation. The rogue nation also moves simultaneously with respect to the actions taken by
the alliance members. In the overall game there are (I + 1) players, with the alliance members choosing
e¤ort ei, and the rogue nation choosing threat level (e¤ort) tL. The payo¤ for an alliance member is V i and
that of the rogue nation isV l, such that V i(:) = M i +
PI
i=1 e
i[i(t)  PIi=1 ei]   cei, for i = 1; 2; ::; I; and
V L(:) =ML + L(e)tL   (tL)2   vtL, for l: We have e =PIi=1 ei:
We can solve for the Nash equilibrium of the overall game by solving for the Nash equilibrium level of e¤ort
of each country in a game within its alliance, taking the joint e¤ort level of the enemy as given. This will
give us the joint e¤ort level of the alliance, as well as the choice of threat by the rogue nation, as a reaction
function of the other. Using these reaction functions, we can arrive at the equilibrium level of threat and
security e¤ort. In the Nash equilibrium of the intra-bloc game for the alliance, e¤ort is provided solely by
country I and is given by:6
eN = eI =
1
2
[I(t)  c]
The threat by the rogue nation is given by:
tL =
1
2
[L(e)  v]
Now, we must solve for the equilibrium of the game between the alliance and the rogue nation, which
e¤ectively reduces to a game between the two countries I and L; having e¤ort choices eI and tL; and payo¤
functions V I and V L. Here V I(:) = M I + eI [I(tL)   eI ]   ceI and V L(:) = ML + tL[L(eI)   tL]   vtL
and eI = eN and tL = tN : So, the Nash equilibrium e¤ort outcome for this game is described by the pair
(eN ; tN ) given by the simultaneous solution of the equations:
eN =
1
2
[I(tL)  c]
and
tN =
1
2
[L(eI)  v]
for tN = tL and e = eN = eI : Let us call eN the unilateral e¤ort level for the alliance.
6See Gupta (2010) for a detailed formulation and solution of the e¤ort provisioning game within the alliance. I am using
this result, derived at length in that paper, here.
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Remark 1 The slope of the reaction function of the alliance is @e
N
@tN
> 0; and that of the rogue nation is
@tN
@eN
< 0:
2.3 E¢ ciency with endogenous threat
I now solve for the e¢ cient level of joint e¤ort of the alliance:
MaximizefPmi;eg IP
i=1
V i(:) =
P
i
mi +
P
i
e[i(t)  e];
s:t:
P
i
mi + ce =
P
i
M i;
X
mi 2 [0;1); e 2 [0;1)
or
Maximizefeg
P
M i + e[
P
i(t)  Ie]  ce; e 2 [0;1)
Solution to the FOC of the above problem gives us the e¢ cient solution:
eE =
1
2I
[
IP
i=1
i(t)  c]
If the alliance provisions the e¢ cient level of e¤ort eE and not the unilateral level eN , the rogue country L
will make e¤ort
(A)
tL = tE =
1
2
[L(eE)  v]
We notice that this level of e¤ort is di¤erent than that seen in the last section, since it is a best-response to
the e¢ cient e¤ort level by the alliance, and not the unilateral level eN . Let us call this tE ; though we must
be careful to remember that it is the Nash outcome for the game between the alliance and the rogue nation
and not an e¢ cient" threat level, in any sense.
Thus, putting t = tE in the equation for eE we get:
(B)
eE =
1
2I
[
IP
i=1
i(tE)  c]
The equilibrium at the inter-bloc level is given by the pair (eE ; tE) got by simultaneous solution of equations
(A) and (B). The e¢ cient level of e¤ort for the alliance may be more or less than the unilateral level, as seen
in the following result.
Lemma 1 The e¢ cient level of joint e¤ort eE is lesser (greater) than the unilateral outcome eN for I(tN ) RPI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I :
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Proof. eE S eN for 12I [
P
i 
i(tE)  c] S 12 [I(tN )  c]:
Rearranging the terms of the latter inequality, we arrive at the above result.
Comparing the above result to its counterpart for endogenous threat, seen in Gupta (2010), we notice that
here the index  shifts for a change in e¤ort level, since the level of threat is sensitive to the e¤ort level of
the alliances. Thus, whether the e¢ cient e¤ort level is more or less than the unilateral level depends not
just on the ex ante values of the s, but their ex post values, if the alliance were to shift to the e¢ cient level
of security from the unilateral level. In other words, the e¢ ciency level is dependent on the magnitudes of
shift of these indices, for a change in the level of threat that would occur from a shift in the security level.
Assumption: I assume that ex post nation I still has the highest :
The next result relates the level of threat observed in our model, to the level of security that is provisioned
by the alliance. It seems fairly intuitive that if the level of e¤ort at the e¢ cient outcome is less than the
unilateral outcome for the alliance, then the equilibrium amount of threat in the former situation will be
more compared to the latter. The opposite should hold for the situation where the level of e¢ cient security
e¤ort is more than the unilateral level. Conversely, if the level of threat is higher for the alliance making
the unilateral e¤ort level, compared to the level of threat if they play the e¢ cient outcome, then it must be
true that the e¤ort in the unilateral outcome is lower than that in the e¢ cient outcome. These results are
proved below.
Lemma 2 If security e¤ort at the unilateral outcome is greater (lesser) than that at the e¢ cient outcome,
then the threat level is lesser (greater) at those respective outcomes, and vice versa, i.e. eN ? eE () tN 7
tE :
Proof. See appendix 1.
We note that since tE > tN implies eE < eN ; it must be true for tE > tN that the condition I(tN ) >PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I must hold (using the above result and lemma 1). In other words, if ex-post e¢ ciency
requires a drop in security levels, then the average of the public opinion indices (even after the increase in
the threat level), must be still lesser than the ex-ante public opinion index in country I.
2.4 Payees
In Gupta (2010), I outlined an institutional structure which would enable the alliance to move to the e¢ cient
level of security provision, from the unilateral level. For that purpose, I constructed a game of security e¤ort
provision among the members of the alliance, with an additional neutral player" participating in the game
along with the original members of the alliance. This game is described in detail in Gupta (2010). The
institutional structure implied by this game (which leads to the e¢ cient provisioning of global security), and
the details of the real life implementation of the institution are the main contributions of the mentioned
7
paper. For the benet of the reader, a short description of a slightly modied version of this institutional
game" is provided in appendix 2. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the purposes of this paper is to
test the robustness of this proposed institution in the presence of endogenous threat (threat was exogenous
in Gupta(2010)), as well as derive insights into the conditions that must prevail to preserve the e¤ectiveness
of this institution in this modied environment. In order to achieve these goals, the rst step is to nd out
in our current model which of the alliance partners would be willing to pay to move from an allocation with
e¤ort vector with joint e¤ort provision at eN , to one at which the joint e¤ort is eE , and how much.
For a country to be willing to pay a positive amount zi for this movement, it has to be true that its utility
from eE must be greater than from eN , even after it pays zi: For the unilateral outcome, no country pays
anything. In our current environment, the change in the threat level in response to the alliances action,
becomes important. The individual rationality condition for i being willing to pay zi > 0 to achieve the
e¢ cient e¤ort outcome over the unilateral outcome is [V i(mE ; eE ; tE) j zi > 0]  [V i(M i; eN ; tN ) j zi = 0]:
The notation is as seen in earlier sections, and the superscripts for the security e¤ort, threat levels and the
private goods are self explanatory. We now nd out that for a certain country willing to pay for the change,
what is the maximum amount that it is willing to pay.
Lemma 3 If the utility of a country rises for a change in the e¤ort level, the maximum amount it might
be willing to pay for the change, given that it makes no e¤ort contribution in the e¢ cient allocation, is
eEi(t
E
)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2:
Proof. See appendix 1.
Remark 2 Note that zi > 0 =) i(tE)  eN
eE
i(tN ) + (e
N )2
eE
  eE > 0, as we have assumed that e¤ort levels
are non-negative.
We will now group the countries according to their willingness to contribute to a fund for transfers that need
to be given to move to the e¢ cient outcome.
Case (I). eE > eN : We will group the countries according to their willingness to contribute for a change in
outcome. In order to do this, we categorize the nations according to their shift in  between the unilateral
outcome and the e¢ cient outcome.
For nation i we have
zi = i(tE)  e
N
eE
i(tN ) + ; where  =
(eN )2
eE
  eE
Since tE < tN for eE > eN (vide lemma 2), and i(tE) < i(tN ) since t > 0, it follows that zi > 0 i¤
i(tE) > e
N
eE
i(tN )    (note that  = (eN+eE)(eN eE)
eE
is negative, and that e
N
eE
< 1). So, the willingness to
contribute to the fund depend on the change in (:) and the values of eE and eN .
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One of the main di¤erences with the results of Gupta (2010) is the crucial importance of how the public
support index evolves between the unilateral and e¢ cient states (rather than the ex ante level) in determining
the contribution to the transfersfund. In fact, given that e
N
eE
< 1, the ex post level of public support i(tE)
should be su¢ ciently close to the ex ante support i(tN ); for a nation to be willing to contribute a positive
amount to the transfersfund, in the case where the ex post e¢ cient level of security is higher than the ex ante
unilateral level. This is not surprising, when one realizes that greater security would reduce threat levels,
hence reducing the publics appetite for security (even though, on one hand, greater security related benets
accrue to the nation). Hence a positive contribution towards enhanced security levels can be supported only
if the appetite for security remains high enough, even with a reduction in the threat level. In order to make
our task simpler, we can construct i = i(tE)  eN
eE
i(tN ) and rank countries according to the value of their
s, such that 1 < 2 < ::: < j < j+1 < ::: < I 1. We note that this ranking of a country in this case is
di¤erent from its ranking according to the value of (:). The value of the s obviously depend on the change
in (:) and the values of eE and eN .7
Remark 3 It follows that if there are j nations in the alliance with i = 1; :::; j such that i > , they
would be willing to pay a positive amount for the movement to the e¢ cient outcome.
Case (II). eE < eN :
For nation i let
zi = i(tE)  e
N
eE
i(tN ) + ;where  =
(eN )2
eE
  eE
Since tE > tN for eE < eN , we have i(tN ) < i(tE): Also, in this case  = (e
N+eE)(eN eE)
eE
is positive, and
that e
N
eE
> 1:
Now, let
 =   e
N
eE
i(tN )
Note that for  > 0; zi > 0: In this case, i(tN ) < eN   (eE)2
eN
(solving for  > 0). This could happen for a
low enough i(tN ), or a low enough e
N
eE
(i.e. the ex post and ex ante e¤ort levels are close), or both.
However, for  < 0 (which entails a high enough i(tN ); i.e. i(tN ) > eN   (eE)2
eN
), for zi > 0 we need either
a high enough i(tE) (i.e. i(tE) > ), or a low enough e
N
eE
(i.e. the ex post and ex ante e¤ort levels are
7This easily seen. Consider a country having a shift in  from 9 to 1, and another having a higher initial value of ; 11,
which shifts to 10. The ranking of the s for the countries is preserved, but the change for the rst country is higher. However,
in an alternate scenario, if the rst country has a shift from 5 to 1, and the second a shift from 11 to 6, then the change for the
second country is higher.
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close),8 or both.
So to make our task simpler, let us construct i = i(tE)   eN
eE
i(tN ), and rank countries according to the
value of their s, such that 1 < 2 < ::: < J < J+1 < ::: < I 1. Of these, let J nations have i > 0.
Loosely speaking, for a large enough di¤erence between the unilateral and e¢ cient security levels, these
would typically be nations whose ex post levels of the public support index are su¢ ciently greater than the
ex ante levels. In other words, lesser security (due to the movement to eE) raises the threat, making the
public in these nations su¢ ciently raise their appetite for security. In reality one would expect the public
support for security in these nations low to begin with, causing them to advocate for a reduction in the
security level. The reduced security would raise threat levels, but would cause a decline in the negative
e¤ects of security e¤orts (as seen earlier), and also enhance the publics appetite for security. So, for the
governments of these nations, the movement to the e¢ cient level would cause an ex post increase in utility
levels.
Remark 4 It follows that these J nations (with i = I J ; :::; I 1 > 0) may be willing to pay a positive
amount for the movement to the e¢ cient outcome.
However, as we will see in the next section, I will not be able to include all these nations that are potentially
willing to pay for a movement to the e¢ cient outcome among my set of payee nations" in the institutional
scheme designed by me for achieving the e¢ cient level of joint security by the alliance of nations facing the
rogue nations threat.
2.5 Recipients
In this section, I will analyze who will need to be paid for the alliance to move to the e¢ cient level of security.
In what follows, I assume that country I, which had the largest ex ante public support index among the
countries in the alliance still has the largest public support index ex post. In other words, the  ranking
of country I is preserved, even if the alliance moves from the unilateral to the e¢ cient security level. From
appendix 2, the reader will observe that I have the neutral player propose that the alliance shift to the
e¢ cient level with the members nations provisioning the e¤ort prole (ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E): In other words,
in both the unilateral, as well as the e¢ cient scenarios, country I is the only nation undertaking security
e¤ort. In what follows, I will analyze in spirit of the institution suggested in Gupta (2010), which countries
need to be paid (and how much), to realize this proposed e¤ort prole.
For country I, a movement to the e¢ cient level will not entail a loss in utility, if it is given a transfer  ,
seen below. As the unilateral e¤ort level was chosen by country I in the benchmark model, even when the
e¢ cient e¤ort was available, this transfer level should be positive.
 I = V I(mN ; eN ; tN )  V I(mE ; eE ; tE)
= fM I + eN [I(tN )  eN ]  ceNg   fM I + eE [I(tE)  eE ]  ceEg
= eNI(tN )  eEI(tE)  (eN   eE)[(eN + eE) + c]
8This is easily seen. For eE  ! eN ; eN
eE
 ! 1, reducing zi = i(tE)  i(tN ) + eN   eE which is positive in this particular
case.
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Let us now move on to the other nations that are adversely a¤ected by a movement from the unilateral to
the e¢ cient level of joint e¤ort. The main purpose of this exercise is to determine which countries have to be
given a transfer (which I would like to be the minimally required amount, rather than one which would be
Pareto improving for all member nations of the alliance) to maintain the e¤ort prole (ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E).
1. Case (I): eE > eN
First, note that the ex post level of e¤ort provision for each country, given joint e¤ort from other allies at
eE and threat level tE , is bei = 12 [i(tE)   2eE   c]. This is the level of e¤ort that a country would supply,
if it had to ght the rogue nation with joint e¤ort xed at eE from the side of all its other allies. Now, for
eE > eN ; no country would want to deviate from zero e¤ort. This is easily seen, as bei < eE (since bei < eN ,
as tE < tN ): Hence, if no other country other than I was supplying e¤ort in the unilateral (Nash) outcome,in
the e¢ cient outcome no one else would have an incentive to make e¤ort. This means that for e¤ort eE by
I, the best response of other countries would be to make no e¤ort. This means that to achieve a prole
(ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E) with eE > eN ; no other country other than I needs to be compensated by the payee
nations (discussed in the last section).
2. Case (II): eE < eN
Now, let ei = 12 [
i(tE)  c] be the private e¤ort level of a nation, i.e. the e¤ort level it would provision if it
had to ght a threat level tE alone, without the help of any allies. For joint e¤ort eE < eN (supplied by I),
countries having private provision ei levels greater than eE would have an incentive to deviate from zero
e¤ort (and make up the di¤erence between eE and ei, gaining utility in the process),9 and hence make it
di¢ cult to sustain the e¤ort prole (ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E). It is easily veried that these are countries for
which i(tE) >
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I . However, this can be prevented by having a transfer scheme in which
they would be compensated up to their utility level for their private provision level (conditional on making
no e¤ort). This level of transfer is given by  i = V i(mi0; ei   eE ; 0 j ei)  V i(mE ; 0;  i j eE)
= ei[i(tE)  ei]  c(ei   eE)  eE [i(tE)  eE ]
= (ei   eE)[i(tE)  (ei + eE + c)]10
The set of countries for which these transfers are needed contains not only nations which su¤er a loss in
utility due to a movement from the unilateral to the e¢ cient e¤ort level, but may also contain some countries
which gain from the movement. The reason they get compensated is because their ex post private provision
level is more than the e¢ cient level. Hence they must to compensated to maintain zero e¤ort levels, if the
e¤ort prole (0; 0; ::0; eE) has to be maintained.
2.5.1 The subgame perfect equilibrium of the institutional game
In this section I will outline the main result of this paper. The proposition below describes the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the institutional game described in appendix 2. This proposition is relevant for the
case eE < eN , and a similar result can easily be derived for the case eE > eN , which I leave to the interested
reader, for the sake of brevity.
9Note that for eI = eE and ej = 0, for j 6= i; I, ei = 1
2
[i(tE)  c  2eE ] = 1
2
[i(tE)  c]  eE = ei   eE , where ei is the
private provision level of i:
10Notice that this compensation amount is one which puts a recipient country at its utility level for the joint e¤ort provision
of the alliance being at its ex post private provision level, but it having to bear the cost of provision only for the amount of this
e¤ort which is above the e¢ cient level. Simple algebra shows this transfer amount to be positive, substituting for ei, eE ; and
using the facts that i(tE) >
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I
+
c(I 1)
I
as ei > eE
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In what follows, S is the set of all nations in the alliance, the set P consists of a set of payees among
the nations in the alliance: This set contains nations with i > 0 (see section 2.4 above) and i(tE) >PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I : The set R consists of all other nations in the alliance (for the sake of simplicity I
make the minor assumption that there are no nations with the same ex ante and ex post utilities). I have
also assumed that if a country gets the same payo¤ from making zero e¤ort and a positive e¤ort, then it
makes no e¤ort. As detailed in appendix 2, other than these players, there is a neutral" player in the
institutional game" who acts as a proposer and facilitator. I assume that the ex-post e¢ ciency conditionP
i2P
zi >
P
i2R 
i +  I holds.
Proposition 1 The prole ({Agree, ei = 0 for NP}i2P , {ei = 0 for P & NP}i2RnI and i<0, {Agree, ei = 0
for NP}i2RnI and i>0;{Agree, eI = eN for NP}) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the institutional game,
for the elements proposal by the neutral player being such that:
(i). zi for all i 2 P such that 0  zi 6 eEi(tE)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2; and P
i2P
zi =
P
i2R 
i +  I :
(ii). The neutral player proposing to compensate player I an amount  I = eNI(tN )   eEI(tE)   (eN  
eE)[(eN + eE) + c] for eI = eE ; and 0 otherwise.
(iii). Proposing to compensate players i 2 RnI an amount  i = (ei   eE)[i(tE)   (ei + eE + c)], for
choosing ei = 0 in the e¤ort choice subgame with transfers, and 0 otherwise:
(iv). The proposal requiring unanimity support of nation I, nations i 2 P , and nations i 2 RnI and i > 0
who are the only nations invited to vote on the proposal.
This subgame perfect outcome of the institutional game has all invited voters agreeing to pass the neutral
players proposal in the second round and all alliance members i 2 S making e¤ort choices in the third round
such that the e¤ort outcome is (ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; :::; e
E): Hence, the joint e¤ort of the alliance is at the e¢ cient
level.
Proof. See appendix 1.
This proposition gives the central result of this paper. This result suggests a particular institutional structure
for the alliance (closely mirroring the one suggested in Gupta (2010)) that would help it reach its e¢ cient
e¤ort level. For such an institutional structure, unilateral action by a single nation would be tempered
towards the e¢ cient outcome by multilateral participation by other alliance members. Comparison of the
results obtained in the two papers is discussed in section 3. Note that in the above mechanism, nation I is
getting cheated" a little bit, compared to the other recipients, because they are getting compensated up
to the utiltiy of their ex post private e¤ort" levels, while nation I is getting compensated only up to the
utility of its ex ante private e¤ort level (or in other words the unilateral e¤ort level). However, it can do
nothing about it, because if it does not agree to the proposal, the status quo remains, hence as the unilateral
provider in the benchmark case, it can do no better.
2.6 Declining public support
In the previous section I have assumed that  is increasing in the level of threat t, hence it > 0. However,
there are some real world occurrences where for some nations the reverse is true, i.e. an increase in the
12
threat level actually weakens public support for their contributions security e¤orts of the alliance. This
may particularly be true if these countries are initially low targets for the threats, but then become targets
- making the public feel a that a lower prole in security activities would again make them low priority
targets.11 In order to model this phenomenon, I now assume that for the countries belonging to set P in
the earlier section, it < 0 (so public support begins at a certain level, but as threat levels increase, they go
down). For all other nations it is still positive.
1. Case (I): eE > eN
Since tE < tN for eE > eN (vide lemma 2), for the nations in set P , i(tE)>i(tN ): This means that in this
case eE = 12I [
PI
i=1 
i(tE)  c] will be higher than the e¢ cient e¤ort level when all nations had it > 0. Thus
the transfer  I needed to make nation I supply the higher e¢ cient level of e¤ort will be higher:
@ I
@eE
=  I(tE)  eE @
I(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
+ 2eE + c =  I(tE)  eE @
I(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
+
PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
> 0
(substituting for eE and using the facts that I(tE) < I(tN ) <
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I ;
@I(tE)
@tE
> 0; and
@tE
@eE
< 0)
Recall that there are no other recipients of transfers (except for I) in the case where eE > eN :
Now, for nation i 2 P we have
zi = i(tE)  e
N
eE
i(tN ) + ;where  =
(eN )2
eE
  eE
Since for eE > eN we now have i(tE) > i(tN ); rather than i(tE) < i(tN ) as before, it follows that
the value of zi is higher in this case (or the maximum amount country i is willing to pay for a movement
to the e¢ cient level has gone up compared to before). So even though a higher transfer amount has to be
supported by the payee countries, given that reduction of the threat actually increases the public support
for the conict, it might be easier to support the (higher) e¢ cient amount of joint e¤ort in this case.
Case (II). eE < eN :
Since tE > tN for eE < eN , for the nations in set P , i(tE)<i(tN ): This means that in this case eE =
1
2I [
PI
i=1 
i(tE)   c] will be lower than the e¢ cient e¤ort level when all nations had it > 0. We see below
the transfer  I needed to make nation I supply a lower e¢ cient level of e¤ort might be higher or lower:
11The experience in Spain after the Madrid train bombings of 2004, with resultant decline in public support for the war in
Iraq (which was low enough to start with), is a case to the point.
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@ I
@eE
=  I(tE)  eE @
I(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
+ 2eE + c =  I(tE)  eE @
I(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
+
PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
S 0
@ I
@eE
< 0 if
eE @I(tE)@tE @tE@eE
 <
PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
  I(tE)
and
@ I
@eE
> 0 if
eE @I(tE)@tE @tE@eE
 >
PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
  I(tE)
(substituting for eE and using the facts that I(tE) > I(tN ) >
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I ;
@I(tE)
@tE
> 0; and
@tE
@eE
< 0)
We see in one of the cases above that a lower transfer might be required to get to the lower e¢ cient e¤ort
level in the case where a combination of factors occur: eE is high enough, the gain in public support due to
the increase in the threat level is su¢ ciently high, and the absolute level of public support in the e¢ cient
state is also suitably high. Thus, the perverse e¤ect of decreasing security, leading to a greater threat, drives
up public support, and also saves on costs (as e¤ort provision falls), hence requiring less compensation in
form of transfers (as this increasing public support and cost savings increases the utility of government I to
a su¢ cient level). In the other, more intuitive case, a higher transfer is needed to compensate nation I ,
for it to move to a lower (e¢ cient) level of e¤ort. As seen below, a similar result does not obtain for other
recipients since they are compensated for their ex post private provison levels (which increases for a lower
e¢ ciency level) - this is not the case for I, which is compensated up to its ex ante private provision level.
Recall that there are other recipients of transfers (other than I) in the case where eE < eN :For these other
recipients of transfers, a reduction in the e¢ cient e¤ort level will also impact the transfer levels. In fact,
the transfer  i needed to make nation i make no e¤ort on its own will be unambiguously higher (for a lower
e¢ cient level of joint e¤ort):
@ i
@eE
= (ei   eE)
"
@i(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
  1
#
  [i(tE)  (ei + eE + c)]
= (ei   eE)
"
@i(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
  1
#
  1
2
"
i(tE) 
 PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
!#
< 0
(substituting for ei, eE ; and using the facts that i(tE) >
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I as e
i > eE ; @
i(tE)
@tE
> 0; and
@tE
@eE
< 0)
Now, for nation i 2 P we have
zi = i(tE)  e
N
eE
i(tN ) + ;where  =
(eN )2
eE
  eE
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Since for eE < eN we now have i(tE) < i(tN ); rather than i(tE) > i(tN ) as before, it follows that the
value of zi is lower in this case (or the maximum amount country i is willing to pay for a movement to the
e¢ cient level has gone down compared to before). The escalation of the threat decreases the public support
for the conict. The above analysis mostly suggests it might be harder to support the (lower) e¢ cient
amount of joint e¤ort in this case, when public opinions in the allied countries diverge.
3 Discussion
In this section I will discuss some of the implications of the above results, and compare them those found in
Gupta (2010). First, the institutional structure suggested for the realization of the e¢ cient level of global
security in this paper is more inclusive" than the one suggested in the earlier paper. This structure gives all
nations in the alliance, except for those that enjoy hugely positive free-riding benets, a chance to participate
in the decision of whether or not to accept the neutral players proposal. Not only that, since all voting
nations have de facto veto rights", all these nations have a strong say in the decision-making process. From
a democratic perspective, this certainly seems desirable.
The most important contribution of this paper, the one which becomes possible to make due to the endogenity
of the threat level, is to study how the evolution of public opinion in the member nations in the alliance might
inuence the movement to e¢ ciency. In the case where the e¢ cient security level is more than the unilateral
level, one of the main di¤erences with the results of Gupta (2010) is the crucial importance of how the
public support index evolves in the payee states, between the unilateral and e¢ cient states, in determining
the contribution to the transfers fund. In fact, the ex post level of public support should be su¢ ciently
close to the ex ante support for a nation to be willing to contribute a positive amount to the transfersfund.
This occurs because greater security would reduce threat levels, hence reducing the publics appetite for
security (even though, on one hand, greater security related benets accrue to the nation). Hence a positive
contribution towards enhanced security levels can be supported only if the appetite for security remains high
enough, even with a reduction in the threat level.
For the case where the e¢ cient level is lower than the unilateral level, for a large enough di¤erence between
the unilateral and e¢ cient security levels, the payee nations would typically need to have ex post levels of
the public support which are su¢ ciently greater than the ex ante levels. In other words, lesser security (due
to the movement to the e¢ cient security level) raises the threat, and that in turn should cause the public in
these nations su¢ ciently raise their appetite for security. In reality one would expect the public support for
security in these nations low to begin with, causing them to advocate for a reduction in the security level.
The reduced security would raise threat levels, but would cause a decline in the negative e¤ects of security
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e¤orts, and also enhance the publics appetite for security. So, for the governments of these nations, the
movement to the e¢ cient level would cause an ex post increase in utility levels.
This paper also analyzes the implications for the scenario where the public opinion supporting the conict
actually drops in a subset of member nations of the alliance, when the level of threat increases. It turns out
that the transfer needed to shift to the e¢ cient level of security, when the e¢ cient level is higher than the
unilateral level, is more than in the earlier scenario (when the public support in all nations increase for a
higher threat). However, as the maximum amount the payee countries are willing to pay for a movement
to the e¢ cient level goes up compared to before (given that reduction of the threat actually increases the
public support for the conict) it might be easier to support the (higher) e¢ cient amount of joint e¤ort in
this case. On the other hand, if the e¢ cient security level is less than the unilateral level, the maximum
amount payee countries are willing to pay for a movement to the e¢ cient level has goes down compared to
before, as the escalation of the threat decreases the public support for the conict. This suggests that it
might be harder to support the (lower) e¢ cient amount of joint e¤ort in this case. Interestingly, in this case
a scenario is possible where a lower transfer might be required to get the unilateral provider to the lower
e¢ cient e¤ort level: for that to happen, a combination of factors must occur - the e¢ cient level of security
is high enough, the gain in public support due to the increase in the threat level is su¢ ciently high, and
the absolute level of public support in the e¢ cient state is also suitably high. Thus, the perverse e¤ect of
decreasing security, leading to a greater threat, simultaneously drives up public support and saves on cost,
hence requiring less compensation in form of transfers (as this increasing public support increases the utility
of government of the country supplying the security e¤ort to a su¢ cient level, to compensate for the actual
loss in security itself). Of course, as seen in the earlier section, the case where a higher level of transfers is
needed, is possible as well under certain circumstances.
4 Conclusion
Often rogue nations react to the actions of an alliance of nations (for example, the NATO) ghting them.
We extended our model (seen in Gupta 2010) in this paper, by taking that into account. In order to that,
we have considered a rogue nation that strategically makes threatening e¤ort. The rogue nation and the
alliance interact, and the e¤orts of both are endogenously determined. The ndings obtained when threat
is exogenous (as seen in Gupta (2010)) do not qualitatively change when it is endogenized, as regards the
existence of an institutional structure that would facilitate the alliances movement from a unilateral to an
e¢ cient level of global security. However, there are interesting implications of how endogenity of the threat
level makes the evolution of public support for the conict (in the allied nations combating the threat) very
16
important. The e¤ect of evolving public support in the achievement of an institutional structure, that would
help the alliance reach an e¢ cient level of global security, is analyzed in detail in this paper. Further work
would involve extending this analysis, when there is uncertainty regarding the evolution of such support.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If eN ? eE ; then (eN ) 7 (eE) (since e < 0)
Thus, it follows from the solutions for tN and tE that tN 7 tE :
Now, for tN > tE ; let eN > eE :
If eN > eE ; then (eN ) < (eE), since e < 0.
But this violates the original premise that tN > tE (as per the solutions for tN and tE , this would follow
from (eN ) < (eE)).
Thus, it must be true that eN < eE :
So, for tN > tE ;it must be that eN < eE : Similarly, for tN < tE ;it must be that eN > eE :
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. From the individual rationality condition, a country i might be willing to pay a positive amount, i.e.
zi > 0;only when [V i(mE ; eE ; tE) j zi > 0]  [V i(M i; eN ; tN ) j zi = 0]
Or, [V i(mE ; eE ; tE) j zi > 0]  [V i(M i; eN ; tN ) j zi = 0]  0
We note that the utility of i 6= I for the unilateral outcome is M i + eN [i(tN )  eN ];
And its utility in the e¢ cient outcome is M i + eE [i(tE)  eE ]  zi
So, [V i(mE ; eE ; tE) j zi > 0]  [V i(M i; eN ; tN ) j zi = 0]  0
=) fM i + eE [i(tE)  eE ]  zig   fM i + eN [i(tN )  eN ]g  0
=) z i eEi(tE)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2
Thus, the maximum amount i would be willing to pay for the change is eEi(tE)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part A: The e¤ort choice for i 2 RnI in the third stage of the institutional game is zero
Note that for countries i 2 RnI the best response function in the status quo game is: ei = 12 [i(tN )   c  
2
P
j e
j ]; for i > c+ 2
P
ej ; j 6= i and 0 otherwise.
In the institutional game with transfers, given  i = (ei   eE)[i(tE)   (ei + eE + c)] for ei = 0 and 0
otherwise, the best response e¤ort level is zero, for eE by I and no e¤ort by others.
This is because from the best response function ei = 12 [
i(tE)   c   2Pj ej ]; for i > c + 2P ej ; j 6= i
and 0 otherwise, its best response to eE by I and no e¤ort by others, is to make e¤ort ei   eE : The
payo¤ from making this e¤ort is V i(mi0; ei   eE ; 0 j ei) if eI = eE : But payo¤ from making no e¤ort is
V i(mE ; 0;  i j eE). Since by construction V i(mE ; 0;  i j eE) = V i(mi0; ei   eE ; 0 j ei); i0s e¤ort level zero
is payo¤ equivalent to making e¤ort.12 Note that if a country gets the same payo¤ from making zero e¤ort
and a positive e¤ort, then it makes no e¤ort (by assumption).
Further, for ei =  6= 0;  i = 0 and eI = eE   , for no e¤ort by the other players. Using the best response
functions, it is easy to check that these strategies are indeed best responses to each other.
12 In this proof V i(mi; ei;  i(ei) j e) denotes is utility from its consumption of the private good mi, the amount of e¤ort ei
that it puts in, and the transfer  i(ei) it gets (dependent on its e¤ort), given the joint e¤ort level e. Note that an e¤ort level
ei is weakly preferred by i to an alternate level ei0, if V i(mi; ei;  i(ei) j e) > V i(mi0ei0;  i0(ei0) j e0) for given e¤ort levels of all
j 6= i:
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Hence, is payo¤ from deviation is M i + eE [i(tE)  eE ]  c < M i + eE [i(tE)  eE ] +  i:
Thus, ei = 0 maximizes (weakly) is payo¤, given eI = eE    and ej = 0; j 6= i; I:
Part B: In the second stage of the institutional game, voters unanimously agree" to the neutral players
rst stage proposal
By construction V i(mE ; 0;  i j eE) +  i = V i(mi0; ei   eE ;  i = 0 j ei) for i 2 RnI and i > 0:
By construction V I(mE ; ei = eE ; tE) +  I = V I(mN ; eN ; tN )  V I(mE ; eE ; tE) for I:
As 0  zi 6 eEi(tE)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2 for all i 2 P; V i(mE ; ei = 0;  i j eE)  V i(M i; ei =
0;  i = 0 j eN ) for these players.
Hence agreeing to the neutral players proposal at least (weakly) dominates not agreeing for all voters. Hence
the proposal is unanimously adopted.
Appendix 2: The Institutional Game
This game is described in detail in Gupta (2010). In brief, let the set of all the I members of the alliance
be called S. The transfers will be paid by a set of payees P  S to a set of recipients R  S. In what
follows, I will outline a game of perfect and complete information in which all the members belonging to
the sets P and R participate, along with a neutral player (think of the neutral player as an entity within a
supranational agency, like the O¢ ce of Security within the NATO). There will be certain rules of interaction
among the players. From these rules it is possible to identify an institutional structure for the alliance that
would lead to the e¢ cient outcome. I call the game described below the institutional game. All players
in this game are rational and have complete information. This game exists only if P is non-empty: It is
assumed that the ex-post e¢ ciency condition outlined in the paper holds. The "institutional game" is as
follows:
There are four stages in this game. In the rst stage, the neutral player makes a proposal to the other
players. The proposal is a collection of elements [P;R; (T i)Ii=1; (e
i)Ii=1], where P is a set of payees, R is
a set of recipients, (T i)Ii=1 is a vector of transfers paid by payees and received by recipients, and (e
i)Ii=1
is a particular e¤ort vector. For what follows, let the e¤ort vector proposed by the neutral player be
(ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E): P and R are such that P [R = S; and P \R = :
In the second stage, the players in the set P , player I, and players in set (R with i > 0) simultaneously
vote either Agree or Not Agree to the proposal. As mentioned, for the payees the proposal contains a total
amount that they need to pay and a rule to divide the payment among them. For I; the proposal commits
to pay an amount of transfer  to him, dependent on it making the e¢ cient e¤ort level. For the proposal
to be adopted, it must be adopted unanimously by all players in the set P and player I. Otherwise the
proposal fails, and no transfers are made. Once a player votes for the proposal, it is committed to adhering
to it. It is not possible (by membership rules of the alliance) for any member of P to make a private transfer
to any other player, other than through the neutral player. If the proposal succeeds, the neutral player
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takes the amounts given in vector (T i)Ii=1 and holds them. If it does not, no payments are made, that is
(T i)Ii=1 = (0
i)Ii=1:
In the third stage, the alliance members i 2 (RnI and i < 0) play a simultaneous-move non-cooperative
game of e¤ort choice for adoption of the proposal. For non-adoption of the proposal , there is the status
quo e¤ort choice game with all players in S. If the proposal was adopted in the second stage, there is an
e¤ort choice game where transfer amounts are committed by the neutral player to recipients according to a
scheme outlined in the proposal (which is discussed in detail later). In brief, the neutral player commits to
pay players i 2 R a transfer sum zi 2 <  from the transfer amounts handed over to it by the payees, if the
e¤ort chosen by them is zero. If, however, they make positive e¤ort then they do not receive this transfer.
For the proposal being adopted and the set (RnI and i < 0) being empty, there is no third stage, the fourth
stage described below follows the second. In this paper I assume the more general case, so the set (RnI and
i < 0) is assumed to be non-empty:
The fourth stage is the payments stage (for the game with transfers). Payments are made to all recipients
upon observation of e¤ort or money given back to payees, in full or in part (dependent on the e¤ort choices
of the players in set R).
Lastly, it is assumed that the neutral player does not retain any money itself (thus, the amount paid by the
payees equals the amount received by the recipients) and conforms to all the rules of the game described
above.
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